



THE ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 




The importance of financial linkages among countries in the crisis spread, 
is currently a highly debated topic. Small shocks caused by the collapse of the 
financial system of a country can easily turn into a crisis, of dimensions that can 
be hardly imagined. There are several channels which could play an important 
role  in  transmitting  the  initial  shock.  Focusing  exclusively  on  rational 
explanations,  the  financial  crisis  in  one  country  could  provide  negative 
information about other countries with similar characteristics. 
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Financial linkages between countries 
In a Bayesian frame, learning based on rational agents could precipitate a 
financial crisis, once investors have seen the crisis in a country
1 (Chen, 1999). An 
important channel that could play a role in crisis’ transmission, is the channel of 
commercial linkages between countries (imports and exports). For example, after 
an initial shock in one country, countries which have strong trade ties with it will 
receive  this  negative  shock  too.  In  addition,  strategic  interactions  between 
countries in the international financial system might alter the impact of that initial 
shock  to  the  system.  It  is  important  to  find  out  how  the  crisis  is  transmitted 
throughout the entire system, taking into consideration the equilibrium between 
countries' trade balances and other links. In particular, it is important to know 
whether the global financial system amplify or attenuate the initial shock caused 
by the country fragility. 
Using the domino's game as example, where the first piece starts falling 
and hitting other parts nearby, we might consider that the pieces of dominoes are 
countries and the procentage of trade with other countries in total foreign trade 
give the closeness. In particular, we want to know what happens to the second line 
of Domino's, after the first fell. Thus, throut the international financial system, the 
first question to ask ourselves is: “The likelihood of damaging a country depends 
on it’s "proximity" to the country which initially had problems?” The question of 
interest is that, unlike a game of dominoes, in which parts are static, when we 
consider the international financial system, the guvernment may take an action 
after the initial shock that will take the country away from the line of contagion. 
                                                 
* Ruxandra Vilag, George Ionescu, Iuliana Predescu, Stela Toader are professors at the Romanian-
American University 
1 Chen, in his work refers to bank failures spread, through those who store money, but since banks 
are the most important link of the financial system we can extrapolate his claims.  
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In  other  words,  it's  like  dominoes  game  pieces  have  been  able  to  adjust  their 
positions.  In  addition,  the  actions  of  the  executive  power,  those  who  take 
decisions on the domestic economy or financial system, are influenced by both 
their country investors and internal conditions, but also by investors from other 
countries and the external environment. Therefore, not only our domino pieces are 
not static, but they also have an internal characteristic (domestic investors) that 
can  completely  change  the  initial  shock  transmission.  Therefore  it  should  be 
studied how national systems behave on the international market, after the initial 
shock, taking into account the reaction of investors. 
To  measure  trade  ties  between  Romania  and  other  countries  we’ve 
calculated it’s share of foreign trade with that country in total foreign trade of 
Romania. 
In the figure below, we selected those countries with which Romania is 
carrying on commercial transactions (import and export), amounting more than 
1% of Romania's total foreign trade. The strongest trade ties are those with Italy 
(22.06% of total) and Germany (15.38% of total). We can also see in the figure 
that the trade of Romania with the European Union countries are more than 70% 
of our country foreign trade. Given this and considering that Romania is an EU 
member since 2007 we could deduce that business and political ties and even 
those relating to macroeconomic bases (since the integration into the European 
Union requires a common market with the same operating rules and the Euro 
zone) between Romania and the European Union are very strong. The emergence 
of  financial  market  crises  it’s  transmitted  primarily  through  the  traditional 
channels, which indicates that the Romanian economy will be strongly influenced 
by economic developments occurred in member countries of the European Union. 
However the influence of these markets can not be of 100% because foreign trade 
does  not  reach  100%  with  them  and  from  the  macroeconomic  point  of  view 
Romanian economy is not identical with that of the European Union as a whole. 
Even  a  brief  discussion  on  the  application  of  mathematical  models  in 
financial practice, in general, would be incomplete without some warnings on 
their use. Sometimes we lose sight of the ultimate goal of these models when the 
math part becomes very interesting. The mathematical financial models can be 
applied very precisely, but models are not very precise in their application over 
the real world. Their accuracy as a useful approximation of the environment varies 
significantly with time and space. Models should be applied in practice only as 




                                                 
1 R.C.Merton, the speech at the Nobel Prize 1997 "Aplication of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty 





At it’s simplest level, the real crisis is different from that expected one in 
three ways. First, the current crisis presents itself as a global crisis, not one limited 
to the U.S. economy or even focused on it. More or less simultaneously, each 
economy has experienced the same problems: a collapse of assets value that have 
undermined the solvency of key financial institutions, puting lending to a sudden 
halt, and a sharp contraction in consumer demand. In fact, while the crisis was 
taking place, the U.S. vulnerability appeared to be lower than that of many other 
countries. For example, at the end of the second quarter of 2009, 12 countries 
(nine of them in transition) have attracted a total of $ 35 billions from the IMF 
standby account and the interest rate margins of many countries have underlined a 
much higher risk of default than the U.S.’s. Secondly, weaknesses in the financial 
sector,  in  particular,  seemed  to  characterize  almost  all  countries.  The  error  of 
deregulation, lack of dishonesty and the stimulation of reckless behavior were 
apparently universal, to the extent that, for many observers, the economic crisis 
was a financial crisis in all material respects. Thirdly, rather than lose power, the 
dollar  has  shown,  at  least  temporarily,  that  is  a  pillar  of  strength:  immediate 
response to the financial difficulties being experienced in the summer - autumn 
2008 was a net inflow of capital to the U.S. and especially a rush to acquire short-
term  liquidity.  Past  controversies  about  U.S.  external  deficits  seemed  almost 
strange now, echoes of another era. 
However in dealing with this topic caution is needed. Behind the story that 
follows is a default model that may seem strange to economists accustomed to 
thinking in terms of equilibrium results. Instead, structural features, particularly 
the funding constraints that apply to income and expenditure, are emphasized. It 
doesent  mean  that  the  effect  of  responsibility  delegations  is  ignored;  the 
behavioral responses of income and prices changes is taken into account, but the 
base model is one where the primary forces are inertial, behavior largely governed 
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by convention and uncertainty prevents reaching a final equilibrium. In addition, 
political  and  economic  considerations  are  central  and  provide  the  framework 
within which private actors are adapting. So, a formal model incorporating these 
features and sufficiently developed to capture the characteristics of this "story". 
This requires an easier, less falsifiable way of explanation, but in any case, a 
careful  description  of  events  is  necessary  before  we  could  begin  to  test 
hypotheses. 
 
The present financial crisis 
The crisis that began in the summer of 2007 came as a surprise to many 
people.  However,  for  others  it  was  not  a  surprise.  John  Paulson,  hedge  fund 
manager,  has  correctly  predicted  the  subprime  market  debacle  and  earned  3.7 
billion U.S. dollars in 2007, as a result. Global financial system vulnerabilities 
have been discussed in prior reports of Bank of England and Financial Stability 
Report.
1 “The Economist” has estimated that, some time before real estate prices 
in the U.S. and a number of other countries, have created a speculative bubble and 
was therefore expected to decrease.
 2 
Although,  as  predicted,  lower  prices  of  U.S.  property  that  were  the 
fundamental causees of the crisis, the effects it had on financial institutions and 
markets have not been estimated. Particularly, what was perhaps most surprising 
is the role played by liquidity in the current crisis. 
The  current  crisis  is  one  of  the  most  dramatic  and  important  crisis  in 
decades. The reasons behind it and its deployment revealed a number of new 
concerns and issues for policy makers, practitioners, and academics interested in 
the financial and monetary issues. 
Central  banks  worldwide  have  followed  the  crisis  development  with 
numerous interventions. Some of these interventions aimed on reducing monetary 
policy rates and injecting liquidity into the system. Other interventions aimed a 
framework change of standard operating systems or the creation of innovative 
forms of special liquidity. 
For  example  the  Romanian  National  Bank  began  lower  the  reference 
interest rate since sepetembrie 2008, nearly a year after the global financial crisis 
began. Although it seems a late intervention it’s likely that these measures were 
taken when the financial crisis began to have an impact on the national economy. 
However its current level (6.5%) is lower than its initial level (before the crisis, 
the reference rate was 6.10%). The evolution of the reference interest rate folows 
the  crisis  developments  in  Romanian  economy,  the  Romanian  National  Bank 
trying to counteract the effects of this crisis by injecting liquidity in the market, 
resulting lower cost of credit. It thus seeks to boost investment. 
 
                                                 
1 Bank of England (2006) and (2007). 






Overall, though the actual effects of the crisis, to a certain extent have been 
limited, the initial signs of spreading seems to have developed. Lending standards 
and terms for both commercial loans as well as industrial, and commercial real 
estate loans have become tougher and corporate bond yields rose significantly in 
the first half of 2008, indicating increasing pressure and risks of non-financial 
corporate  sector.  Loans  remained  available  to  the  corporate  sector  so  far,  but 
lending  to  households  decreased.  Similar  changes  took  place  in  the  UK  and 
Europe. The USD exchange rate fluctuated during the crisis, with a general trend 
of  depreciation  against  most  currencies.  Employment  began  to  decline 
substantially in February 2008, and inflation is also beginning to be a source of 
concern.  Economic  growth  remained  low  in  the  first  half  of  2008,  and  the 
weakness  of  the  real  estate  markets  have  persisted,  along  with  tighter  credit 
conditions for corporations and individuals; the economic growth also declined in 
the second half of 2008. 
After three years from 9 August 2007 the financial crisis is still ongoing. 
For a short period of time, it was thought that the losses could be lower. But these 
hopes have disappeared once the 2008 and 2009 statistics appeared. Recession is 
now  official  for  many  industrialized  countries  and  developing  countries.  For 
example, in Romania, more than 575,000 unemployed workers were registered 
between December 2007 and March 2010. 
 
Chanels of crisis transmition  
There are many examples in economic and financial history of financial 
crises that were followed by recessions. There is therefore a particular need to 
explain  why  financial  crises  lead  to  recessions  and  which  channels  transmit 
financial shocks into the actual activity. 
There were many studies written about bank costs and the financial crisis. 
In most cases, these costs were assessed ex-post
1. Since the financial crisis is still 
an ongoing process, it would be dangerous to give a final evaluation of financial 
problems effects. It is more important to show that financial shocks have always a 
                                                 
1See Hoogarth and Saporta (2001) for a review of the literature and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
for a brief descriptive insight into the costs of the largest financial disasters. 
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significant negative impact on real activity and then look at the current situation. 
We  exclude  purely  statistical  methods  consisting  in  estimating  the  decline  or 
increas  in  pre-crisis  period  production
1.  These  approaches  can  be  useful  to 
compare the financial crises on common basis but is very difficult to measure 
these characteristics. It is first necessary to define precisely the beginning and the 
period of crisis. Costs also vary depending on their estimation, in terms of results 
or output growth. Most important is the assumption about the time - three or five 
years  -  used  to  estimate  the  pre-crisis  trend.  It  may  not  have  any  economic 
significance,  as  may  be  overstated  if  there  were  clear  signs  of  overheating. 
Finally, this method can not estimate the causal links. So the decline in growth 
comes from financial difficulties or other shocks. The role of stock prices, house 
prices, interest rates and credit is not stated as necessary to clarify the causal links 
based on transmission channels of fully identified structural shocks. 
The current financial crisis, characterized by a sudden collapse of stock 
markets, a fall of real estate prices and a paralysis of the interbank markets, induce 
different types of shocks that affect consumption and investment decisions and 
then actual production. In particular, non-financial agencies (eg, households and 
firms) are faced with an atack on their financing conditions or on their property, 
and with a shock of uncertainty (Spilimbergo et al., 2008). While their size varies 
from one crisis to another, these shocks have been observed periodically during 
the financial crisis. 
Thus,  Romania  has  the  folowing  evolution  of  individual  consumption 
determined by the current crisis: 
 
 
We can see that the evolution of population expenditures is in decline just 
until  the  fourth  quarter  of  2009,  than  registering  a  slight  increase,  given  the 
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The interest rate channel (or cost of capital channel) 
The cost of capital channel is a key mechanism in transmission of interest 
rate shocks (due to changes in liquidity in the interbank market and/or changes in 
monetary policy) in the standard Keynesian model. Assuming the link between 
prices and wages, a decline in interest rate (reducing capital costs), induces an 
increase in investment spending, leading to an increase in aggregate demand, and 
then  in  production.  A  similar  line  of  reasoning  is  valid  for  the  investment 
decisions in real estate or durable goods purchases by households, with a decrease 
in interest rates accounting for a decrease in the cost of borrowing. 
To operate this chanel, two key elements are to be taken into account (see 
Mishkin, 1995, 1996). On the one hand, decisions taken by households and firms 
are affected by the real interest rates - rather than the nominal one - meaning that 
an increase in prices in the economy is necessary. On the other hand, decisions of 
households and firms take into account long-term interest rates - rather than the 
short  term  -  meaning  that  changes  in  short-term  rate  (for  example,  due  to, 
monetary policy actions of central bank ) should lead to corresponding changes in 
long-term interest rate (real)
 1. When a financial shock, a direct impact on short-
term (eg, a shock on bond market) or on short-term rates (for example, a shock on 
the interbank market) rather than monetary policy actions themself, may change 
the interest rate term structure. Financial turbulence, by inducing a reduction of 
available liquidity for commercial banks, led to a sharp rise in interbank rates. 
How quickly and to what extent this shock is transmitted to the interest rates paid 
by firms and households is usually an empirical question. However, Lucas "critic" 
may be particularly relevant in times of real “turbulence”.
 2 
While theory suggests that this channel can play a key role, the inability of 
empirical  studies  in  finding  a  strong  impact  of  interest  rates’  changes  on 
investment  and  consumption  decisions,  led  us  to  consider  other  channels  of 
monetary policy transmission, especially credit channel and the effect of "wealth”. 
However in response to the financial crisis that began in the United States 
the Romanian National Bank, dropped its interest rates for the first time and thus 
facilitate  lending  investments,  and  economic  development,  but  after  the  first 
quarter of 2008 the interest rate returned to initial the value (before the crisis). 
 
The importance of the financial effects 
Current turbulences gives a central role in the transmission of the financial 
crisis  to  real  economy.  As  shown  by  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988)  and  by 
                                                 
1If, as is implied by the term structure of interest rates, long-term rate is an average of expected 
future short-term rates, a decrease of (real) short-term rate results in a decrease of (real) long term 
rate, one that stimulates investment firms and public expenditure 
2 For France, late transmission of interbank rates for those of borrowers were estimated at two or 
three months (depending on the type of credit) in the last decade (Coffinet, 2005). However, due to 
a deterioration in the balance sheet, banks may have little incentive to move quickly to a lower 
interest rate set by the central bank rigrading debtor rates. For the United States, see Mishkin 
(2009) on the transmission of the Federal Reserve reduced rates, rates on households and firms in 
the current crisis.  
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Bernanke and Gertler (1995, 1996), financial imperfections (due to informational 
asymmetries) contributed to the transmission – due to leverage – of the monetary, 
real and financial shocks. 
Several  mechanisms  explain  the  phenomenon  of  financial  gain
1 . 
Borrowers  must  pay  an  external  premium,  which  is  specific  for  each  debtor, 
according to his financial situation
2. (the greater the information asymmetry, more 
costly the external financing, the greater the net assets, less costly the external 
financing
3.)  Thus,  a  monetary,  real  or  financial  shock,  which  either  change 
nonfinancial agents revenue or reduce the value of the collateral, will result in a 
larger  external  financing  premium.  Investment  and  consumption  projects
4 of 
limited  agents  will  then  be  modified,  in  turn  enhancing  their  initial  shock.  In 
addition, since the external financing premium depends on net worth of agents, 
banks can adjust the balance sheet in favor of large companies at the expense of 
small ones. 
The  current  financial  crisis  by  inducing  tighter  financial  conditions, 
decrease in household financial assets and, together with the growth deteriorated 
prospects, it has a negative impact on the enterprises and households financial 
situation. The financial accelerator is, thus, an important channel through which 
financial  shocks  reach  the  real  economy,  as  a  result  of  investment  and  lower 
consumption, far beyond the effect of "wealth" and higher costs of capital. 
Other empirical works (eg, Peek and Rosengren, 1995) found that shocks 
on banks’ capital induce banks to reduce their credit supply, which enhances the 
credit channel power. 
5 Following a shock that lowers the quality of their assets, in 
order  to  meet  their  prudential  ratios,  banks  are  reducing  exposure  to  risk  (by 
offering  smaller  loans)  or  increased  bank’s  capital.  However,  in  a  context  of 
asymmetric information, raising capital is costly, especially in "troubled" financial 
and economic times. Even if governments have contributed to the recapitalization 
of banks, the risk of banks' portfolio adjustment still remains. In this case, lower 
cost of non-financial agents would came from a reduction in credit supply - rather 
than from a reduction in credit demand. 
                                                 
1 For the effect of wealth estimation see Houizot et al. (2000), ECB (2009). 
2 The premium is due to additional costs incurred by creditors in order to investigate and monitor the 
results (declared) by the debtor. 
3 Specifically, the net asset reflects the ability of borrower - the person or company - to provide 
certain guarantees on its financial assets and/or real estate, net of its debt. 
4 Pioneer  models  consider  only  the  effects  on  investment  firms.  But  the  model  can  be  easily 
extended to household consumption by assuming that real estate assets (buildings) are used as 
collateral (see Goodhart and Hofmann, 2007 and Mishkin, 2007). 




We can see in the figure above that following the begining of the crisis in 
Romania it started the increase of the volume of loans relative to deposits. Also in 
December  2009  this  ratio  riches  it’s  lowest,  after  the  outburn  of  the  crisis 
(112.8%) recently we can see that the report began to rise again, leading to the 




However,  one  can  see  that  direct  investment  of  nonresidents  on  the 




The  current  crisis,  with  purely  financial  matters,  induces  greater 
uncertainty for economic agents. Economic growth and employment prospects are 
not just bad-oriented, but are also uncertain. Firms and households must decide 
how  much  to  invest  and  consume  in  a  risky  environment,  which  can  lead  to 
behavior such as "expected to see." In a context of greater uncertainty, households 
tend to save more just to be cautious. For example, empirical studies show that 
fluctuations in the unemployment rate - used as a proxy of uncertainty - have a 
(huge) negative impact on consumption. For businesses, the continuation of this 
reasoning is based on irreversible investment decisions, as some installation costs 
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investment projects, waiting for better times. Thus, the investment is made only if 
the gains are greater than costs of installation. Uncertainty surrounding the global 
macroeconomic situation could cause actual firms to postpone (some) investment 
decisions, slowing demand and future production. 
 
Bibliography 
B.Bernanke & A Blinder (1988), „Credit, money, and aggregate demand”, 
American Economic Review 98 (mai), pag. 435-439. 
B.Bernanke  &  M.  Gertler  (1995),  „Inside  the  black  box  :  the  credit 
channel  of  monetary  policy  transmission”,  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives 
vol.9 n°4, pag. 27-48.  
B.Bernanke, M.Gertler & S. Gilchrist (1996), „The Financial accelerator 
and the flight to quality”, The Review of Economics and Statistics vol. LXXVIII 
n°1, pp. 1-15. 
Y.Chen  (1999).  "Banking  Panics:  The  Role  of  the  First-Come,  First-
Served Rule and Information Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, 107(5), 
pag. 946-968 
Claessens,  Kose  and  Terrones  (2008),  „An  Anatomy  of  Credit  Booms: 
Evidence  From  Macro  Aggregates  and  Micro  Data”,  IMF  Working  Papers 
n°08/2006. 
J.Cofinet (2005), „Politique monétaire unique et canal des taux d’intérêt 
en France et dans la zone euro”, Bulletin de la Banque de France n°136, pag. 29-
40. 
C.Goodhart & B. Hofmann (2007), „House prices and bank credit », in 
House prices and the macroeconomy : implications for banking stability” editat de 
C. Goodhart & B. Hofmann, Oxford University Press. 
G.Hoggarth  &  V.  Saporta  (2001),  „Cost of banking system instablity : 
some empirical evidence”, Bank of England Financial Stability Review iunie, pag. 
148-165.   
C.Houizot, H. Baudchon, Mathieu C. & F. Serranito (2000), „Plus-values, 
consommation et épargne : Une estimation de l'effet richesse aux États-Unis et au 
Royaume-Uni”, Revue de l’OFCE, N°73, Avril. 
R.C.Merton, the speech at the Nobel Prize 1997 "Aplication of Option-
Pricing Theory: Twenty Five Years Later 
F.S.Mishkin  (1995),  „Symposium  on  the  Monetary  Transmission 
Mechanism”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 9, Number 4, Fall, pag. 
3-10.  
F.S.Mishkin (1996), „Les canaux de transmission monétaire: leçons pour 
la politique monétaire”, Bulletin de la Banque de France, N°27, Mars. 
F.S.Mishkin  (2007),  „Housing  and  the  monetary  transmission 
mechanism”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium. 
F.S.Mishkin (2009), „Is Monetary policy effective during financial crises”, 
NBER Working Paper Series, N°14678, January.  
 
47 
J.Peek & E. Rosengren (1995) , „The capital crunch : neither a borrower 
nor a lender would be”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking vol.27 n°3, pag. 
625-638. 
S.Van  den  Heuvel  (2002),  „Does  bank  capital  matter  for  monetary 
transmission ?”, FRBNY Economic Policy Review may, pag. 259-265. 
Bank of England (2006) and (2007) 
The Economist (2005) and (2006).  
ECB (2009), „Housing wealth and private consumption in the Euro area”, 
Buletinul lunar, Ianuarie.  
 
   